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Electing the House of Lords: the STV voting system fits the
required criteria very well
Alan Renwick explores the proposals for reforming the House of Lords with a view to
explaining the specific consequences of the Single Transferable Vote (STV) system –
arguing that it would be unlikely to bring the party domination seen in Australia. 
The parliamentary select committee that has examined the government’s proposals
f or ref orm of  the House of  Lords published its report on 23 April. They recommend
using the Single Transf erable Vote (STV) f orm of  proportional representation. This
system will give voters a choice between voting f or individual candidates and f or a single party t icket (see
the transcript of  their oral evidence session last December, when they quizzed Iain McLean and me on
this subject). It is the f orm of  STV used in many Australian elections, where voters can vote ‘above the
line’ f or a party or ‘below the line’ f or individual candidates.
The Electoral Ref orm Society is crying f oul over this. Calling the proposals a ‘dog’s breakf ast’, they say
that STV with above-the- line voting will return power to the parties, rather than allowing voters to
determine who gets elected.
What should dispassionate observers make of  this? I think three questions need to be considered. First,
how much power would the inclusion of  a party voting option give to parties and to voters? Second, how
much power should parties and voters have in determining which candidates are elected? Third, are there
any other considerations that we should take into account bef ore deciding whether we think that
possibility of  above-the- line voting should be welcomed?
STV systems with above-the- line voting are currently used only in Australia. The f irst such system was
introduced f or the Australian Senate elections 1984 and has been retained ever since. Similar systems
have now been adopted f or upper house elections in South Australia, New South Wales, Western
Australia, and Victoria. In most of  these cases, voters can either vote f or one party above the line or
rank the candidates below the line. New South Wales now has a variant under which voters can either
rank parties above the line or rank candidates below the line.
As the Electoral Ref orm Society points out, the proportion of  voters in f act voting above the line in
Australia is very high: as the f ollowing table shows, it was higher than 95 per cent in the most recent
election in each of  these jurisdictions. With such high ticket voting rates, it is virtually impossible f or a
candidate to be elected out of  rank order.  In f act, not one candidate has been elected out of  rank order
since above-the- line voting was introduced (I’m gratef ul to Antony Green, Australia’s leading elections
expert, f or conf irming this by email). This means that Australia has, in ef f ect, something very close to a
closed- list proportional system.
Rates of above-the-line voting in recent Australian elections
Australian
Commonwealth
Senate (2010)
New South Wales
Legislative
Council (2011)
South Australia
Legislative
Council (2010)
Western Australia
Legislative
Council (2008)
Victoria
Upper House
(2010)
96.1% 97.8% 96.8% 96.1% 96.0%
Sources: Australian Electoral Commission and relevant state electoral commissions.
At the same time, the Electoral Ref orm Society is wrong to imply that we should expect the same pattern
to apply here. In most of  these Australian cases, if  a voter chooses to vote below the line, she or he
must rank every candidate – of  whom there may be several dozen – in order to cast a valid vote.  In the
extreme case of  New South Wales in 1999, there were 264 candidates. This makes voting f or individual
candidates much more onerous than voting f or a party t icket, so it is hardly surprising that the vast
majority of  voters choose the latter option.
In the UK, by contrast, a vote would be valid even if  only one candidate pref erence were expressed, so
the ef f ort required to vote below the line would be no higher than that required to vote above the
line. We can theref ore expect more personal votes to be cast than in Australia.
But just how many more? The Australian evidence here isn’t very usef ul. The most permissive Australian
case is Victoria, where a valid below-the- line vote in state Upper House elections requires only f ive
pref erences. The table above suggests that this makes no dif f erence to the number of  personal votes
cast. But we shouldn’t inf er too much f rom this. First, Victoria introduced this system only in 2006. Voters
had become accustomed by then to voting above the line in Senate elections, and it is hardly surprising
that they extended their habit to the new venue. Second, providing f ive pref erences is still a lot more
onerous than casting one party vote.
In terms of  voter experience, the closest analogues to what the select committee has proposrf  f or UK
second chamber elections are not the Australian systems, but rather list proportional systems in which
voters have the option, if  they wish, to express one pref erence (or perhaps more) among individual
candidates. These systems model much more closely the sort of  choice that will be available to voters in
the UK.
If  we look at such systems, we f ind that the proportion of  voters who actually exercise their right to
express a pref erence varies hugely. Uwe Kitzinger f ound that in Austria in the 1950s f ewer than 1 per
cent did so. Today, as Lauri Karvonen (in this book) shows, around 20 per cent of  Austrian voters do so,
while around two thirds do so in Belgium and 90 per cent in Brazil.  These cases paint a very dif f erent
picture f rom the Australian evidence.
This wide variation makes it very dif f icult to predict what would happen in the UK. Given that Brit ish
voters don’t much like parties, have very litt le experience of  voting f or party t ickets, and seem particularly
to value independent-mindedness in the second chamber, it seems reasonable to expect that many
would exercise a right to vote f or individual candidates.
So what do I think?
In sum, then, we can say that, while allowing an above-the- line option makes total party domination
possible, that is unlikely in the UK given the other rules proposed and the habits of  voters. Nevertheless,
above-the- line voting would almost certainly increase signif icantly the power of  parties to determine
which of  their candidates are elected.
I argued in the Polit ical Studies Association’s brief ing paper on House of  Lords ref orm that STV was
clearly the best system f or electing a ref ormed second chamber. I wasn’t trying in that paper to push a
particular perspective, but this particular point seemed quite uncontroversial. A proportional system is
needed to make it hard f or any one party to secure a majority – a goal that virtually everyone agrees
on. And if  independence is valued – both the relative independence of  party representatives f rom the
party whip and the presence of  independents who take no party whip – then STV is superior to any list-
based f orm of  PR.
This remains my view. Above-the- line voting would be unlikely to bring the party domination seen in
Australia, but it would nevertheless enhance the power of  parties in a way that is not clearly justif ied. It
might give some voters an option that they would value, but it would also increase the dangers of
conf usion. I make no claims f or STV across the board: f or f irst chamber elections in parliamentary
systems, it carries signif icant dangers. For the proposed elected second chamber in the UK, however, it
f its the criteria that most people want very well.
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